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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal raises two questions. First, we address 
whether the District Court properly applied a two-level 
sentence enhancement pursuant to United States 
Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or the "Sentencing 
Guidelines") S 5K2.17, for possession of a high-capacity, 
semiautomatic firearm in connection with a crime of 
violence. Second, we decide whether the District Court 
properly applied another two-level sentence enhancement, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.2, which allows for an upward 
departure in cases where significant physical injury was 
inflicted by the defendant. We answer both of these 
questions affirmatively and therefore affirm. 
 
I. 
 
On January 12, 1999, after contemplating suicide, 
Dominic E. Philiposian picked up his rifle, an AK-47, and 
loaded it with a double thirty round magazine containing 
fifty-nine rounds of ammunition. The AK-47 is a high 
velocity military-style weapon that increases the speed at 
which a bullet travels, thereby increasing both the shooter's 
accuracy and the resulting risk of death or serious bodily 
injury. Philiposian's magazine contained two types of 
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ammunition: full metal jacket ammunition designed for 
warfare, and jacketed and hollow point bullets designed to 
expand on contact and cause aggravated wounds. 
 
At the same time, Theresa Ebinger, a letter carrier for the 
United States Postal Service, was delivering mail to the 600 
block of 11th Avenue in Prospect Park, Pennsylvania, where 
Philiposian lived in a third floor apartment. Instead of 
shooting himself, Philiposian noticed Ms. Ebinger walking 
outside, pointed his AK-47 at her, and fired twice through 
his closed apartment window. One bullet hit Ms. Ebinger in 
the arm, ripping a four centimeter hole just above her left 
elbow. The bullet then entered her abdomen and bullet 
fragments were spread throughout, severing the left lobe of 
her liver, perforating her duodenum, lacerating her 
pancreas, and fracturing her ribs. 
 
As a result of the injuries, Ms. Ebinger received 
emergency surgery and remained in the hospital for one 
month. She also underwent four additional surgeries for 
her arm but has not regained full use of her hand and arm 
due to the extensive nerve damage. Additionally, doctors 
implanted a steel cylindrical sleeve within her arm to 
contain the many unrepaired bone fragments. In a letter to 
the Probation Department, Ms. Ebinger stated that she 
suffers serious physical pain every day, including pain and 
indigestion when she eats, serious pain in her arm, as well 
as the inability to perform daily functions such as cutting 
food or typing letters. 
 
After being apprehended outside his building, Philiposian 
was charged via a three count indictment with (I) assault 
on a federal employee pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 111, (II) 
attempted murder of a federal employee pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. S 1114, and (III) use of a weapon during a crime of 
violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 924(c). At the completion 
of a non-jury trial, the District Court found Philiposian 
guilty of counts I and III, the assault and weapon charges, 
but found him not guilty of count II, the attempted murder 
charge. 
 
On November 2, 2000, Philiposian appeared before the 
District Court for sentencing, and received fifty-four months 
imprisonment for the assault charge and a consecutive one 
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hundred twenty month prison sentence for the weapon 
charge. In addition, the District Judge imposed three years 
supervised release, restitution in the amount of 
$261,054.04, and a special assessment of $100. In arriving 
at that sentence, the District Court started with a base 
offense level of fifteen under U.S.S.G. S 2A2.2, added six 
levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2A2.2(b)(3)(C) because the 
offense caused permanent or life-threatening injury, and 
then subtracted two levels for acceptance of responsibility 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1(a). This resulted in a total 
offense level of nineteen and a criminal history category of 
I. 
 
The Government then made two motions for upward 
departures. First, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.17, it 
requested an upward departure for possession of a high- 
capacity semiautomatic firearm in connection with a crime 
of violence. The prosecutor argued that Philiposian's use of 
the AK-47 semiautomatic rifle qualified for an upward 
departure because "the significant injuries sustained are a 
direct result of the nature of the weapon and the type of 
ammunition," and that the nature of the weapon increased 
the likelihood of death or serious bodily injury. Philiposian 
argued that even though the weapon qualified as a high- 
capacity weapon due to its ability to hold more than ten 
cartridges, its high-capacity was negated by the fact that he 
only fired twice. The District Court rejected that argument 
and granted the Government's motion, stating: 
 
        The gentleman did shoot at a moving figure with a 
       particularly dangerous type of weapon and form of 
       ammunition and . . . I find that the nature of the 
       weapon did increase the likelihood of injury and indeed 
       serious injury in the circumstances of this particular 
       case particularly with regard to the shattering of the 
       arm. 
 
        So I am going to grant the Government's motion to 
       depart upward under Section 5K2.17. And again we 
       are supposed to depart upward based on the degree to 
       which the nature of the weapon increased the 
       likelihood of injury. . . . I think that a fair adjustment 
       in this case would be an upward departure of two 
       levels . . . . 
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The Government also requested an upward departure 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. SS 5K2.0 and 5K2.3 for aggravating 
circumstances and extreme psychological injury and the 
extraordinary effect the crime had on the victim. It argued 
that the upward departure was warranted because the 
Sentencing Guidelines do not address adequately the 
combination of physical, psychological, and emotional 
injuries suffered by Ms. Ebinger. However, Philiposian 
argued that the psychological injury was not extraordinary 
and that the pain suffered by Ms. Ebinger was already 
considered by the Sentencing Guidelines in 
S 2A2.2(b)(3)(C)'s six level enhancement for permanent or 
life-threatening bodily injury. 
 
The District Court denied the departure based on 
extreme psychological injury under S 5K2.3, stating that 
anyone who is the victim of this kind of offense"would 
likely suffer psychological injuries resembling or 
approximating those suffered by this victim." Despite not 
being mentioned by either party, the District Court did 
depart upward two levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.2, 
based on the extreme physical pain suffered by the victim. 
It found that the six level guideline enhancement for 
permanent or life-threatening injury was inadequate. The 
Court stated: 
 
        . . . I am ruling that the six level adjustment applies 
       in my opinion to every permanent injury including 
       permanent injuries accompanied by no pain on its 
       face, including permanent injuries that merely deprive 
       someone of the use of a finger or permanent injury to 
       the eardrum as a result of which a person has ringing 
       in the ear or difficulty hearing in one of their ears. 
 
        I am saying where you have horrific, extensive 
       permanent injuries accompanied by serious and 
       unremitting pain which also require extensive physical 
       therapy, in and of itself extremely painful, that is a 
       situation that I believe is above and beyond the typical 
       case contemplated by the six level adjustment and 
       warrants a further upward departure. 
 
        . . . 
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        . . . I am departing upward two levels which I think 
       fairly is the lowest number of levels I could depart. . . 
       upward to capture the situation as I find it to be. 
 
In light of the sentence enhancements, Philiposian's 
offense level totaled twenty-three. The resulting guideline 
range for the assault count became forty-six to fifty-seven 
months. The District Court then imposed the fifty-four 
month sentence on the assault charge followed by the 
consecutive ten year term for the firearm charge. This 
resulted in a total sentence of one hundred seventy-four 
months imprisonment. 
 
Philiposian now appeals the District Court's grant of 
these two upward departures. We exercise our jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and apply an abuse of 
discretion review. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 
100 (1996); United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 798 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
 
II. 
 
The first argument advanced on appeal by Philiposian is 
that the two-level upward departure for use of a high- 
capacity semiautomatic weapon under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.17 
was unjustified because only two shots were fired, and thus 
the high-capacity nature of the weapon did not in this 
particular case increase the likelihood of death or injury. In 
essence, Philiposian argues that "[b]y its own terms, this 
policy statement does not create an automatic upward 
departure for any defendant who possesses a high-capacity, 
semiautomatic firearm during a crime of violence or 
controlled substance offense. Rather, an upward departure 
is only warranted if in the circumstances of the particular 
case, the `nature' of the firearm created a greater risk of 
death or injury." Appellant's Brief at 19. 
 
However, Philiposian reads S 5K2.17 far too narrowly. 
That provision states: 
 
       If the defendant possessed a high-capacity, 
       semiautomatic firearm in connection with a crime of 
       violence or controlled substance offense, an upward 
       departure may be warranted. A "high-capacity, 
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       semiautomatic firearm" means a semiautomatic firearm 
       that has a magazine capacity of more than ten 
       cartridges. The extent of any increase should depend 
       upon the degree to which the nature of the weapon 
       increased the likelihood of death or injury in the 
       circumstances of the particular case. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.17. 
 
As this Court has previously noted: "the plain and 
unambiguous language of the Sentencing Guidelines 
affords the best recourse for their proper interpretation." 
United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Thus, "an adjustment that clearly applies to the conduct of 
an offense must be imposed unless the Guidelines exclude 
its applicability." Id. at 671. Therefore, we find Philiposian's 
argument that the high capacity nature of the weapon did 
not increase the risk of injury to be flawed. 
 
First, the District Court received testimony that the AK- 
47, a high-capacity, semiautomatic weapon, significantly 
increased the likelihood of death or injury. Among other 
things, the increased velocity of the bullets fired from the 
AK-47 would cause fragmenting and injuries to the bone 
upon impact, as well as increase the bullets' accuracy and 
the capacity for causing death or serious bodily injury. The 
testimony also revealed that this type of rifle further 
increased the accuracy of the shooter by increasing his view 
of the target. This evidence alone belies Philiposian's claim 
that the high-capacity, semiautomatic nature of the weapon 
did not increase the likelihood of injury. 
 
Moreover, Philiposian's argument that S 5K2.17 was 
intended to apply solely to circumstances in which the 
weapon was used to fire a significantly large number of 
shots without reloading is contrary to the plain meaning of 
that Guideline. Section 5K2.17 applies if the defendant 
merely "possessed" a high-capacity, semiautomatic firearm. 
Contrary to Philiposian's reading, there is no requirement 
that the defendant "use" that firearm to its full capacity. 
There is no requirement that the weapon even be fired. 
Thus, we cannot accept the narrow reading of S 5K2.17 
advanced by Philiposian because it restricts application to 
those instances where multiple shots are fired or 
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threatened to be fired in rapid succession at multiple 
victims. Such a reading is clearly disproved by the plain 
meaning of the Guideline and its applicability to any 
defendant who merely possesses a high-capacity, 
semiautomatic weapon. 
 
After finding that a defendant possessed a high-capacity, 
semiautomatic weapon, a district court must exercise its 
discretion in deciding the extent of the applicable upward 
departure. The amount of the increase depends on the 
degree to which the nature of the weapon increased the 
likelihood of death or injury. Contrary to Philiposian's 
argument, the District Court correctly exercised its 
discretion in deciding the extent of the departure by 
stating: 
 
        And again we are supposed to depart upward based 
       on the degree to which the nature of the weapon 
       increased the likelihood of injury. I don't know how to 
       measure it and I'm not going to pretend I do. 
 
        I'm sure sound argument could be made [that] there 
       should be a 15 level increase based on the facts that 
       it's twice as likely to result in serious injury but I'm 
       just not going to do that. I think that a fair adjustment 
       in this case would be an upward departure of two 
       levels and that is what I'm going to do. 
 
Because it cannot be said that the District Court abused 
its discretion in granting the Government's motion for an 
upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.17, we affirm 
its imposition of a two-level upward departure. 
 
III. 
 
Second, Philiposian argues that the two-level upward 
departure under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.2, based on the nature of 
the injuries and pain, was unjustified because these factors 
were already taken into account by the upward adjustment 
under U.S.S.G. S 2A2.2(b)(3)(C), which added six levels for 
causing permanent or life-threatening bodily injury. He 
contends that the District Court erred in concluding that 
the injury and pain caused by the shooting fell outside the 
"heartland" of "permanent or life-threatening" injury under 
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S 2A2.2(b)(3)(C). Thus, Philiposian urges that the upward 
departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.2 for the extent of the 
injuries and extreme physical pain constituted 
impermissible double counting. We disagree and hold that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in applying 
this upward departure. 
 
A district court has discretion to "impose a sentence 
outside the range established by the applicable guidelines, 
if the court finds `that there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should 
result in a sentence different from that described.' " 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b)). "Similarly, 
the [sentencing] court may depart from the guidelines even 
though the reason for departure is taken into consideration 
in determining the guideline range . . . if the court 
determines that, in light of unusual circumstances, the 
weight attached to that factor under the guidelines is 
inadequate or excessive." Id. 
 
Here, the District Court determined that although the 
victim's injuries were somewhat accounted for in the six 
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. S 2A2.2(b)(3)(C), her 
"permanent injuries accompanied by serious and 
unremitting pain" were "above and beyond the typical case 
contemplated by the six-level adjustment and warrant[ed] 
further upward departure." In fact, the District Court 
ultimately rejected the same argument Philiposian advances 
on appeal -- that the six-level enhancement for permanent 
physical injury sufficiently addressed the victim's injuries: 
 
        A relatively modest permanent injury gets you six 
       levels, therefore, it might only be fair, logical and 
       reasonable to depart upward so you get seven, eight or 
       nine levels if it's extraordinary permanent injury. . . . 
 
        . . . 
 
        Any injury that is permanent would get you that six 
       levels. . . . Now, this woman has suffered . . . far more 
       significant and horrific physical injuries and we don't 
       need to recount them. We all know what they are and 
       it's uncontroverted what they are and in my opinion an 
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       upward departure is justified when the injuries[,] 
       whether they're serious for purposes of a four level 
       enhancement or permanent for purposes of a six level 
       enhancement[,] are sufficiently above and beyond the 
       norm of what would be encompassed by the 
       adjustment and I think they are in this case. . . . I am 
       looking at the . . . nature and extent and extreme pain 
       associated with the physical injuries to conclude that 
       the six level adjustment which would normally 
       encompass the heartland of permanent injuries is 
       inadequate. 
 
After deciding that an upward departure was appropriate, 
the District Court set the appropriate departure at two 
levels. It reasoned: 
 
       I am sure the victim could make a very convincing case 
       that there should be a ten level upward departure by 
       asking you to spend a day in her body but I am 
       departing upward two levels[,] which I think fairly is 
       the lowest number of levels I could depart . . . upward 
       to capture the situation as I find it to be. 
 
We are convinced that the reasoning employed by the 
District Court in granting the upward departure does not 
evidence an abuse of discretion, and affirm the District 
Court's decision to depart upward two levels pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.2. 
 
IV. 
 
Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
applying the two sentence enhancements, we affirm its 
application of upward departures pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
SS 5K2.17 and 5K2.2. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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